When Israel defeats radical Islamists in war

'Hamas caused this attack, Hamas is the one who brutalized Israelis, Hamas is the one who took hostages and continues to hold them: ...... I have not forgotten and neither have you. And we will not forget," President Joe Biden declared just two days before announcing a dramatic threat to stop supplying Israel with offensive weapons if the Israel Defense Forces invade Rafah. 

Unlike two months ago, when they welcomed the U.S. abstention from a U.N. Security Council resolution on Gaza, this time Hamas spokesmen refrained from publicly reacting to this move by the Biden administration. But they are probably rubbing their hands in glee and thanking Allah for giving them salvation. 

Within this monstrous organization, they understand that Washington is striving to end the war at almost any cost. On the one hand, they are pressuring Israel to make a prisoner exchange deal that would allow Hamas not only to survive but also to rehabilitate itself militarily and improve its standing not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank and the wider region. Meanwhile, Israel has been obstructing IDF operations in Rafah, forcing the opening of the Kerem Shalom crossing just one day after rockets hit the area and killed four IDF soldiers. Despite the fact that most of the humanitarian aid is under Hamas control, it is forcing Israel to increase humanitarian aid, pushing for the opening of the Erez crossing, which was the target of a vicious attack on October 7, and promoting initiatives like a maritime corridor that Hamas could only dream of. In doing so, the Biden administration has given the international community a framework for directing Israel to various channels, implying that the array of pressure tools at its disposal have not yet been exhausted. 

All that is left for Hamas to do is to continue to assert its grandiose demands at the negotiating table, buy time, equip its fighters, use supplies to re-establish its governance, and prepare its forces for continued operations, not only defensive but also offensive. Rafah's current situation does not even rule out the possibility of smuggling or manufacturing means of combat during this period. 

Such a stance is detrimental to Israel, which seeks primarily to secure the release of hostages and to overthrow Hamas in Gaza. Israel's enemies are encouraged by this, even in other arenas. Indeed, from the U.S. perspective, the administration's approach does not help its own efforts to persuade Israel to follow its own initiatives. In the face of the risks inherent in such an idea, it may want Israel to trust its own support, but its actions may lead to the opposite conclusion. Moreover, even Saudi Arabia and other countries can see how Washington treats its key allies in wartime. The current action will likely temper the fervor from Iran's impressive display of kamikaze drone strikes.

The ongoing controversy over the issue of fighting in Rafah provides an opportunity to consider the absurdity of the U.S. posture: Hamas' division in the area, with four brigades, is located along the border between Gaza and the outside world, through which all manner of evil passes, including the smuggling of weapons and technical equipment and the movement of agents and commanders. Rafah is also a refuge for commanders and terrorists fleeing from other parts of Gaza to escape the fighting. Given these facts, does anyone seriously believe that it is possible to defeat Hamas' rule and dismantle its military power without an operation in Rafah? Does anyone believe that limited and targeted air raids can be substituted for them? As far as is known, the U.S. administration, despite its statements, has yet to offer a realistic alternative that could achieve these goals. Indeed, it cannot be expected that the global powers will grasp Rafah with the same level of detail that Israel demands. But it is precisely because of this that one must wonder whether it is appropriate for the White House to discuss how to operate in the region. 

The allegations against Israel regarding the extent of damage to unaffiliated residents are presumably based on data from the Palestinian Ministry of Health, the reliability of which is unclear. Even assuming that this is an accurate figure, the low ratio of the number of people unrelated to terrorists among the casualties is unparalleled in the world. These results were achieved thanks, among other things, to the evacuation of the population and the stringent precautionary measures taken by the Israel Defense Forces. Israel is doing everything it is obligated to do by international law. If it wants to do more than that, the burden of protecting the population should not fall solely on Israel. For example, has Washington considered the possibility of persuading Egypt to allow temporary humanitarian evacuation in Rafah, Egypt, to minimize the risk of harm to the population? With the United States, the European Union, and other countries providing billions of dollars in aid to Egypt's economy in recent years, one might expect a serious discussion of this option as well. In any case, pressure on Israel on this issue will only prove effective for Hamas and other terrorist organizations in their strategy of using the population as human shields. 

As for the Sinai border region, one can assume that the parties in Washington are trying to establish an Israeli-Egyptian coordination mechanism, with American involvement, to prevent arms smuggling. Such has happened before: in January 2009, when Operation Cast Lead ended, Tzipi Livni, then Israeli foreign minister, signed such an agreement that Israel would not continue the war until Hamas was defeated. However, it did not prevent even the smuggling of an ounce of gunpowder. 

Similar assurances were given by U.S. officials in October 2005 when Israel was asked to sign an agreement regulating border crossings from the Gaza Strip. Perhaps this was intended to strengthen Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas ahead of the 2006 Palestinian elections. But nothing came of it. Abbas and his faction were expelled from Gaza. Promises made to Israel were broken. Hamas celebrated its folly. 

Another point of contention is Washington's willingness to leave the civil administration of Gaza to an "improved Palestinian Authority" or some other entity it sees as a replacement for Hamas. This attitude ignores the degree of support for Hamas among Gaza's citizens. Hamas is deeply rooted in every aspect of life in the Strip, casting doubt on the prospect of significant change in the Gaza Strip by an entity that receives Arab and international patronage and holds the reins without Hamas' consent.

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To an outsider, this may seem like the perfect move to solve the Rubik's Cube in one fell swoop. But the closer one gets, the more one realizes that the cube is stuck, something inside is jammed, disorganized, and out of sync so that its sides cannot turn at all. Can we dismiss Hamas' defeat? Is there any entity capable of truly governing Gaza, and is the mention of a "Palestinian state" after October 7 a reward for terrorism? Can we not see that simply discussing it gives Hamas more credibility than it has even in Judea and Samaria? Can we expect Israel to once again take the same risks that got it into its current predicament? The Palestinian Authority has failed to take control of Gaza, cannot fight alone against Hamas in Jenin and Tulkarm, and is encouraging terrorism through payments and praise for terrorists. Or for a Palestinian state. These are just a few of the questions, and not the most difficult ones. One cannot lay out the congratulatory carpet of normalization of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia before the floor is prepared, swept, and leveled beneath it. 

Washington must understand that for Israel, victory over Hamas in Gaza after October 7 has become an existential issue. It is not unlike the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Players in the region and on the international stage, including enemies, allies, and the undecided, are closely watching what is happening in Gaza. Their attitudes and actions toward Israel will depend on the outcome. Unless all of Israel's stated objectives in this war are achieved, the deterrence that was shattered on October 7 will not be restored. 

Otherwise, Israel faces an existential crisis, the temptation to attack will intensify, and its political position will be severely damaged. The room for maneuver that Israel can allow itself under these circumstances is limited. The only way to end the fighting in Gaza is to let Israel win and not let it stop fighting. This is the exact opposite of what the current administration is doing.

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